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ABSTRACT 
 
Studies of corruption and its relationship with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have yielded 
mixed results; some have found that corruption deters FDI but others have found the opposite. 
This paper replicates earlier studies within the OLI paradigm, but also seeks to advance our 
understanding of this relationship by introducing the concept of “corruption distance” 
between pairs of countries and applying it to the special context of Latin America.  
After controlling for institutional variables, results show that corruption distance has an 
asymmetrical impact. Host countries enjoying “positive” corruption distance compared with 
home countries as sources of FDI experience no significant increases or reductions in levels 
of inward FDI. However, “negative” corruption distance suffered by host countries is 
associated with significantly lower levels of inward FDI. We argue that firms from a home 
country with relatively low levels of corruption are unfamiliar with the formal and informal 
institutions associated with corruption. Conversely, firms from home countries with high 
corruption are undeterred by high corruption in host countries.  
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1. Introduction 
Corruption is usually defined narrowly as the abuse of public office for personal gain (Roy & 
Oliver, 2009). This definition is reflected in reported measures of the perceptions of national 
corruption levels (Transparency International, 2010). Such public corruption may have a 
corrosive effect on the integrity of a nation’s entire system (Voyer & Beamish, 2004): it may 
reduce operational efficiency, distort public policy, slow the dissemination of information, 
negatively impact upon income distribution, and increase the poverty of an entire nation 
(Chen, et al., 2010). In the international business (IB) discipline, the study of corruption only 
recently gained prominence as firms from developed countries engaged in operations in 
emerging and transition economies (Rodriguez, et al., 2006). However, despite the popularity 
of the subject, the issue of how corruption affects the attraction of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to a highly corrupt host location is still not fully evaluated in the extant literature. 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) may use care when choosing host countries for their 
foreign subsidiaries because of their concern for the additional uncertainty and operational 
costs associated with corruption (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Corruption has, consequently, 
been considered a deterrent to FDI. A contrary view, however, does exist and has seen 
corruption as a necessary evil, a lubricant for transactions (Meon & Weill, 2010), particularly 
when “institutional voids” are prevalent in developing economies (Khanna, et al., 2010). In 
the words of Cuervo-Cazurra (2008, p. 13), corruption can be “sand or grease.” The recent 
surge in FDI flows into and from developing countries (often with high levels of corruption), 
each accounting for 50 per cent of total inflows and 30 per cent of outflows in 2010 (United 
Nations, 2011), calls for a reconsideration of corruption in the IB literature. 
Corruption varies widely across different locations both in its scope in an economy and in the 
level of uncertainty it creates (Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006).  Also, not all MNEs perceive and 
respond to corruption in the same manner. Besides the direct impact of host country 
corruption on inward FDI, however, formal institutions in the host country may interact with 
institutions in the home country, which may themselves interact with informal institutions 
(Holmes, et al., 2012) and therefore affect the behaviour of foreign investors (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008). In that sense, the degree of uncertainty and the costs associated with 
corruption may vary depending on the country of origin of the foreign investors (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006). For this reason, recent studies have concluded that MNEs located in countries 
with low levels of corruption would avoid investing in highly corrupt countries (Habib & 
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Zurawicki, 2001). With little knowledge of dealing with this phenomenon at home (Pajunen, 
2008), they are more likely to be deterred by high levels of corruption as well as their 
unfamiliarity with it abroad (Driffield, et al., 2013). On the other hand, firms which 
originated in highly corrupt environments may not be as sensitive to high corruption levels 
abroad; they may be attracted by the environment and even take advantage of corrupt 
activities (Suchman, 1995; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
It has been explained that the relative differences between corruption levels in home and host 
countries may influence FDI (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002), and such an influence may be 
asymmetrical according to whether “corruption distance” is positive or negative. We 
therefore further the understanding of corruption and its effects on FDI by replicating earlier 
studies in the unique context of Latin America, where corruption is prevalent, and by 
furthering the concept of corruption distance, distinguishing the effects of negative and 
positive corruption distance. In this sense, we extend to corruption the familiar notion of the 
“distance metaphor”, a staple tool of social science in general and of IB in particular (Shenkar, 
2001): psychic distance (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977); cultural distance (Shenkar, 2001); and 
recently, institutional distance (Schwens, et al., 2011; Eden & Miller, 2004). With this new 
concept to hand, do positive and negative corruption distances (to be defined later) have a 
differential effect on inward FDI? 
We argue that not all foreign investors are affected equally by corruption in the host country 
and, specifically, that firms based in highly corrupt countries are not unduly affected by high 
levels of corruption abroad or by corruption distance. The next section addresses these 
research questions in relation to corruption and FDI by reviewing the theoretical literature on 
corruption. Subsequent sections deal with hypotheses, methodology, results and conclusions.  
2. Theoretical background 
 
The cost-of-doing-business-abroad (CDBA) approach initiated by Hymer (1960) embraced a 
wide range of economic and social variables to explain patterns of FDI. As part of the CDBA 
approach, Dunning’s OLI theory focused on economic efficiency and a wide variety of 
factors associated with geographic distance (Driffield et al., 2013). These covered the whole 
range of business functions, e.g. production, marketing and distribution, and involved such 
important economic distance-associated variables as transport and communications costs, 
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technological knowledge protected behind entry barriers, etc. Calhoun (2002) argues that 
modern IT and globalization have reduced the importance of these economic CDBAs. 
As economic CDBAs have been gradually downplayed in the IB literature, so the social 
content of the CDBA has been developed in the form of the liability-of-foreignness (LoF) 
stream of research (e.g. Zaheer, 1995). LoF (Miller and Eden, 2004) emphasises hazards 
for foreign investors comprising unfamiliarity, discrimination and relational problems 
(managing relations with local citizens and firms), and Miller and Eden (2004) proceed to 
argue that these hazards are best viewed through the lens of institutional theory, 
employing the specific concept of institutional distance.  
 
Institutional theory proposes that firms that are exposed for long periods to the same 
institutions – “…humanly devised constraints on human actions that shape human 
interaction” (North, 1990, 3) -  seek legitimacy, pressured by local institutions towards 
isomorphism. These institutional pressures may be regulative, normative or coercive 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and they may comprise formal or informal pressures, 
where the latter includes phenomena that are elsewhere associated with national culture. 
For example, Kostova (1997, 180) defines normative institutional influence as comprising 
“…social norms, values, beliefs, and assumptions about human behaviour.”   
 
While host country institutions present these hazards for foreign investors, “institutional 
distance” emphasizes the differences between formal and informal institutions in the host 
and home country, and greater distance puts greater pressure on investors to tailor their 
strategies to local institutions Kostova and Roth, 2002).  
 
In this context, “corruption distance” as a LoF can be seen as a unique subset of 
institutional distance that involves both formal and informal institutions in the form of 
both regulative and normative constraints. Local levels of corruption are determined by 
the formal institution of the law and its enforcement, but also by informal social norms on 
what is acceptable. Thus, for example, giving and taking a bribe may seem like a simple 
unskilled task, but a foreigner with limited knowledge of local laws and norms may risk 
exposure.           
2.1 Corruption and the MNE in the host countries 
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Corruption is illegal conduct used by groups or individuals to gain influence over the actions 
of the bureaucracy (Leff, 1964). A wide range of deﬁnitions of corruption have been 
suggested by both scholars and practitioners (Macrae, 1982; Judge, et al., 2011). For example, 
in Kwok and Tadesse (2006, p. 767), corruption is defined as an arrangement that involves an 
exchange between two parties which (1) has an influence on the allocation of resources either 
immediately or in the future; and (2) involves the use or abuse of public or collective 
responsibility for private ends. However, we use the brief version that defines corruption as 
the abuse of public office for personal gain (Roy & Oliver, 2009). This definition is largely 
adopted by IB scholars since public sector corruption is employed as an example of how 
institutional differences can affect the MNE’s investment decision and entry strategies abroad. 
Early studies dealing with the causes and consequences of corruption looked at how this issue 
affected national economies. In this area, authors such as Rose-Ackerman (1978), 
Husted (1994), and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) provided theoretical frameworks using public 
choice, transaction costs economics, and game theory, and ultimately contended harmful 
effects of corruption at national level. The IB field, however, has only recently paid attention 
to the issue of corruption and how it affects the MNE (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). This 
apparent longstanding apathy disappeared once firms from developed countries began 
operating in emerging and transition economies (Rodriguez, et al., 2006) which usually 
present high levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2010). 
Economic approaches to the study of FDI, including transaction cost analysis, generally focus 
on efficiency (Williamson, 1993). In that sense, corruption can be seen in a cost/benefit 
manner that will be deterred if at least one participant of the potential deal encounters costs 
exceeding the benefits (Rose-Ackerman, 2008). The fundamental premise of the TCT when 
analysing FDI activities is that the greater the degree of asset specificity, or ownership 
advantages, the greater the need to enter a foreign market with full ownership (Dikova & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2007). Such asset specificity (consisting of the crucial part of ownership ‘O’ 
advantages in Dunning’s OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1993) that MNEs enjoy whilst local 
incumbents do not, can be exploited abroad to offset their disadvantages. The costs related to 
operating abroad include economic costs caused by geographic distance and social costs 
caused by liability of foreignness, arising from the unfamiliarity, and relational and 
discriminatory hazards that foreign firms face in the host country (Eden & Miller, 2004; 
Zaheer, 1995). 
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Local firms, however, have an advantage over those without close-proximity access since 
they are most likely to reach corrupt deals with public officials and have more access to 
legislators (Anechiarico & Jacob, 1996). Conversely, foreign MNEs face greater uncertainty 
than domestic firms, both in terms of external uncertainty and internal uncertainty due to the 
difficulties of managing employees at a distance and from different cultures. In this sense, 
MNEs can also be affected by corrupt behaviours since these can result in increased costs for 
MNE operations and hence elevated transaction costs (Dahlström & Johnson, 2007). 
However, the effect that corruption has on MNEs located in highly corrupt countries 
investing in host countries with a similar corruption level have not yet been fully studied in 
current literature. 
Another important factor in Dunning’s OLI paradigm is localisation ‘L’ advantages in the 
host country. MNEs locate foreign subsidiaries where operating costs can be minimised and 
where they can internalise activities in order to lower costs derived from risk and uncertainty 
(Wang, et al., 2012). Thus, in addition to costs created by business transactions, MNEs also 
face the higher administrative costs of managing the relationships between parties involved in 
doing business abroad (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Buckley & Casson, 1999); such cost 
being associated with liability of foreignness, where institutional distance and its three pillars 
between the home and host countries are the key driver (Eden & Miller, 2004). 
Institutional distance, defined as the degree of difference or similarity between the regulatory, 
cognitive and normative institutions of two countries (Kostova, 1997), has been used to 
explain MNE behaviour in terms of organizational legitimacy in host countries (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). Based on this premise, location decisions and mode of entry strategies have 
been analysed by taking into account the institutional distance between the home and host 
country (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). In other words, the larger the institutional distance between 
home and host countries, the more difficulty the MNE has building external 
legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The costs involved in establishing and maintaining 
legitimacy places MNEs at a competitive disadvantage (Eden & Miller, 2004). However, the 
sign of such distance has been disregarded in such studies and therefore its effect remains 
unknown.  
When choosing a foreign location for foreign activities, MNEs should take the host country 
institutional characteristics into account. These include the quality of institutions (Kostova, 
1997) and the existence of corruption (Chen, et al., 2010).  Thus, the institutional 
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environment of the home country is also believed to influence the decision of whether or not 
to invest in a highly corrupt foreign location (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). The issue of 
corruption arises when bad policies and/or inefficient institutions are set in place and groups 
or individuals seek to circumvent them (Svensson, 2005). Therefore, corruption can be seen 
as an outcome that reflects a country’s legal, economic, cultural, and political institutions. 
Murphy, et al., (1993) argue that corrupt behaviour can be institutionalised and thus become a 
normal practice in certain locations. Corruption is an informal institutional constraint where 
bribery is socially acceptable. In order to achieve organisational legitimacy in the host 
country, the MNE must comply with the state’s pressures to pay bribes and is likely to do so 
unless the home country prohibits such practices by its MNEs and their subsidiaries (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006). 
Research by Ufere, et al., (2012) found bribe-generating behaviour by entrepreneurs in 
Nigeria, which is governed by a well-embedded set of social norms, rules, routine, and power 
relations may be influenced by the country’s institutional environment.  
We will discuss this in the later section. 
2.2 Empirical Studies of Corruption and its Effect on FDI 
Empirical studies have not consistently found that high corruption in the host country deters 
FDI.  While some authors have found that high levels of corruption have a deterrent effect on 
FDI (Mauro, 1995; Lambsdorff, 1998; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Voyer & Beamish, 2004; Woo 
& Heo, 2009; Wei, 2000), others have not found a relationship between these 
variables (Wheeler & Mody, 1992; Henisz, 2000). Furthermore, other authors have actually 
found that corruption can be positive as it facilitates transactions in countries with too many 
regulations (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Egger & Winner, 2005). 
One possible explanation for the inconsistency in these studies is that not all foreign investors 
are equal and therefore are not equally affected by corruption abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
Another explanation is that foreign investors are not affected by the level of corruption of the 
host country but by the difference in the levels of corruption between the home and host 
countries (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Building on these arguments, this study argues that it is 
not only the distance between corruption levels what may deter FDI but also the direction of 
such distance. Thus, we propose that corruption distance has a negative effect on FDI when 
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the home country has lower levels of corruption than a highly corrupt host country. On the 
other hand, corruption distance may not have a negative effect on FDI when the home 
country has higher levels of corruption than a highly corrupt host location. 
2.3 Corruption Distance and FDI 
Even though it seems logical that foreign firms would design strategies to deal with 
corruption in the host country and that corruption might not affect all firms equally, this has 
not been easy to establish (Rodriguez, et al., 2006). Our aim in this section is to achieve a 
successful reduction by developing a simple terminology that allows for effective 
differentiation of corruption levels of a country. In doing so, we simplify this complex 
environment for corruption by adopting a fairly narrow definition of corruption and 
developing a concept of corruption distance to capture different directions of corruption 
between host and home countries. While corruption may be a feature of transactions between 
private and/or public parties (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002), it is usually identified (e.g. Cuervo-
Cazurra (2006, p. 807) as merely the abuse of public power for private gain. Measures of 
national levels of corruption also reflect this narrow definition, capturing perceptions by 
business people and country experts, of the extent of corruption in the public sector 
(Transparency International, 2010). 
According to Eden and Miller (2004), cultural distance and corruption distance are 
considered as two mixed forms of institutional distance: cultural distance can be decomposed 
into normative and cognitive institutional distance, and corruption distance can be 
decomposed into normative and regulatory institutional distance. There can be substantial 
variation across countries with respect to institutional distance between home and host 
countries.  Both differences between home and host countries could have been a significant 
effect on an MNE when conducting operations abroad since it increases the transaction costs 
and risks associated with operating in an ‘unknown’ business environment (Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2001). While analysing the effects of cultural distance on MNEs, most studies 
propose that as the cultural differences among a home and host country increase, the abilities 
of the MNE to operate in the host country decrease (Hennart & Larimo, 1998). These 
propositions are based on the argument that the greater the cultural distance between a home 
and host country, the more difficulties a foreign manager will have understanding the values 
and norms of the foreign market (Tihanyi, et al., 2005). 
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In their paper, Eden and Miller (2004) have focused on institutional distance in an absolute 
value sense, ignoring whether the home or host country has stronger institutions and how this 
might affect liability of foreignness and the MNE’s ownership strategy. We develop the 
conceptual framework of Eden and Miller (2004) and label the difference level of corruption 
as corruption distance and define it as differences of perceived corruption associated with 
corruption transactions between given nations or states. A situation favouring a host country 
(i.e. with lower corruption relative to home countries) is referred to as “positive” corruption 
distance, and vice versa. 
 An illustrative exercise is to consider the movement between two different corruption 
countries, shown in Figure 1. We use the upper half of Diagram to represent the new 
phenomenon of FDI flow between developing countries (South-South FDI) indicating FDI 
from countries with high levels of corruption (e.g. Mexico) to less corrupt host countries (e.g. 
Chile). These MNEs deal with corruption at home and may feel less pressured by legitimacy 
threats, as they have engaged in the lengthy and expensive process of developing knowledge 
of how to deal with corruption at home (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). They have also engaged 
corrupt officials at home and can make use of such experience. The lower part of Diagram 1, 
on the other hand, represents the situation envisaged in the extant IB literature on corruption 
and FDI, where home (usually developed) countries with relatively low levels of corruption 
are deterred from investing in more corrupt (and usually developing) host countries.  Such 
MNEs are expected to experience difficulties in operating in a highly corrupt foreign 
environment since this condition increases uncertainty and cost of engaging in local 
corruption. These MNEs may also face higher legitimacy issues due to pressures originated at 
home to not engage in corruption abroad. 
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Host Country 
Corruption 
Higher Home 
Country 
Corruption  
Lower Home 
Country 
Corruption 
Positive 
CD 
Negative 
CD 
Zero or positive 
effect on FDI  
Zero or negative 
effect on FDI   
H2a 
H2b 
FIGURE 1: CORRUPTION IN HOME/HOST COUNTRIES AND HYPOTHESES 
FDI   
H1 Negative 
Corruption 
 
In this paper we argue that host country corruption has different effects on investors 
depending on their home country corruption level. This means that home countries with 
lower levels of corruption than a highly corrupt host country will be affected by corruption in 
the host country, while home countries with higher corruption levels than the host location 
will not. For MNEs headquartered in countries with lower levels of corruption than the host 
region, host country corruption represents more risk and uncertainty (and thus higher costs). 
We contend that the host country corruption may have a negative association with inward 
FDI. Therefore we put forward the following research hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Host country corruption will have a negative association with inward FDI. 
However, the degree of risk and uncertainty associated with corruption varies by different 
firms. It is possible that foreign investors from highly corrupt countries use their knowledge 
of how to deal with corruption as a competitive advantage (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2008) against those without such knowledge. Studies analysing MNEs from developing 
countries have found that the experience of operating in less than ideal institutional 
conditions can be considered to be a firm-specific O-advantage (Buckley, et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, these O-advantages enable firms from developing countries to operate more 
efficiently in other developing countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Therefore, drawing 
on their O-advantages, certain firms might prefer to invest in foreign locations that resemble 
their home environment. Building on this premise, corruption can be seen as influencing L-
advantages as either a deterrent or encouragement to inward FDI.  
Acquiring skills in managing corruption may help to develop a certain competitive 
advantage (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002), and thus, when they internationalise, they may not be 
deterred by host-country corruption, and they may take advantage of their knowledge of 
working with a corrupt government at home. They may also be attracted by host-country 
corruption for two reasons: first, they may face lower costs of dealing with host country 
corruption than firms from developed countries, and second, they may even deliberately 
select countries with high levels of corruption (but lower than their own) due to the 
similarities in conditions with their country of origin (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Thus, 
experience of firms in their home markets equips them to deal with host country corruption.   
Accordingly, we additionally propose: 
Hypothesis 2a: As positive corruption distance exists between the home and host countries, 
FDI inflows to the host country is more likely to decrease. 
Hypothesis 2b: As negative corruption distance exists between the home and host countries, 
FDI inflows to the host country is more likely to increase. 
3. Methods 
Corruption is rooted in Latin America and it has a deep effect on the region (Salvia, 2003). 
Thus, it is an ideal location to analyse when studying the ways in which corruption affects 
FDI to an entire region. To do so, home countries will be divided into countries with higher 
or lower corruption levels than the host countries. Also, in order to obtain a better picture of 
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corruption and its effects on FDI, the distance in the levels of corruption of host and home 
countries will be considered. To test our hypotheses, FDI inflows to 12 Latin American 
countries will be analysed from 2006 to 2009
1
: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. Although the 
number of host countries is limited, the result can provide a clear picture of how corruption 
distance affects inward FDI to Latin America. 
We rank home countries as either more or less corrupt than host countries in order to evaluate 
the effect on corruption distance on FDI. By doing so, we can also observe how FDI is 
affected by a region that comprises only developing countries characterised by high levels of 
corruption, according to Transparency International (Transparency International, 2010). The 
effects of corruption can be studied according to whether or not foreign investors are used to 
dealing with corruption in their home countries. Also, we can test if the distance between 
corruption levels affects countries with high corruption levels as well as those with lower 
corruption levels at home. 
3.1 Variables and Measurements 
To test our hypotheses, FDI inflows to Latin America from 2006 to 2009 were used as the 
dependent variable. These flows were obtained from the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) publication in 2010 (ECLAC, 2010). To measure 
corruption we use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International, 
which has been widely used by scholars studying corruption and its effects (Judge, et al., 
2011). The CPI rates countries from around the world from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (clean). 
Although there is an ongoing debate regarding which institutions matter in relation to the 
attraction of FDI (Buckley, et al., 2007),  there are various institutional and macro-economic 
variables that have been used in several studies, including both formal and informal aspects 
of the institutional environment of a host location. These variables are constructs of several 
measures and sources, and hence, provide a more comprehensive measurement than 
individual indicators. However, they present the disadvantage of being estimates and thus, 
could introduce measurement errors (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). Such variables 
encompass both institutional and transaction cost variables and are integrated in our model to 
                                                          
1
 These countries have been selected due to the availability of data in the years mentioned 
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observe their interaction with the corruption level of the host country. A concise description 
of these variables is presented next. 
Firstly we begin with corruption distance when home countries are either more or less corrupt 
than the host countries. We use the distance between the host country and the home country 
according to the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International. By analysing 
corruption distance, we control to a large extent for cultural distance, both can be treated as 
cultural distance (Demirbag, et al., 2007). Furthermore, this measurement is more appropriate 
for our research since we are using a fairly homogeneous host region in terms of national 
culture as our unit of analysis (Zhao, et al., 2004). 
As control variables, we use the human development index published by the United Nations 
(2012) which is a construct made up of GDP per capita, education, and life expectancy at 
birth, as proposed by Globerman and Shapiro (2003). The rule of law index retrieved from 
the World Bank Dataset (2011) measures law enforcement, property rights, crime, etc. 
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2003).  Bureaucracy level ranks countries by the ease with which 
businesses may be started (World Bank, 2011). The infrastructure index was taken from the 
percentage of internet users of the host country (World Bank, 2011). The educational 
attainment index was measured by the total number of college students enrolled in tertiary 
education (ECLAC, 2010). The economic freedom index was used to measures trade, fiscal, 
and monetary policy (Heritage Foundation, 2012). The inflation rate was measured as the 
annual percentage rate in the consumer price index from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 2011). 
The natural logarithm of the total GDP (World Bank, 2011) of the host country was used to 
measure purchasing power of the host country, as used by Globerman and Shapiro (2003) and 
Buckley et al. (2007). Finally, the unemployment rate of the host country was used to indicate 
the attractiveness of the country since investors are aware that employee loyalty will be high 
as chances of finding other employment are slim. The unemployment rate was taken from 
The (United Nations, 2011). 
 
 
Table 1 presents a list of the variables, their measurements, and date sources. 
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 Variable Measure Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Ln FDI Flows Inward FDI Flows in the 
Country in US$, measured as 
natural logarithm 
ECLAC 2010 
    
Independent 
Variables 
Corruption From 10 = highly corrupt to 0 = 
clean 
Transparency 
International 2011 
    
 Corruption Distance 1 Value of the average corruption 
level between the home and 
host country for host countries 
with lower levels of corruption 
than home countries 
Transparency 
International 2011 
    
 Corruption Distance 2 Value of the average corruption 
level between the home and 
host country for host countries 
with higher levels of corruption 
than home countries 
Transparency 
International 2011 
    
 Human Development 
Index 
Combination of three 
measurements, GDP per capita, 
education, and life expectancy. 
From 0 (not existent) to 100 
(excellent) 
United Nations 
Development 
Programme 2012 
Control 
Variables 
   
 Rule of Law Index Measures quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. From 0 (not 
existent) to 100 (excellent) 
World Bank 
Governance Datasets 
2012 
    
 Bureaucracy Rank of countries based on the 
average time to start a business  
World Bank 
Governance Datasets 
2012 
    
 Infrastructure Quality Urban Development Index 
Based on the percentage of 
people using the internet 
World Bank 
Governance Datasets 
2012 
    
 Economic Freedom 
Index 
Includes fiscal, trade, and 
monetary policy. From 0 (not 
existent) to 100 (excellent) 
Heritage Foundation 
2012 
    
 Educational Attainment Total college-age students 
enrolled in tertiary education 
ECLAC 2010 
    
 Host Country Inflation Annual percentage change in 
the consumer price index 
IMF’s annual Balance 
of Payments 2012 
    
 Host Country GDP Natural logarithm of a 
country’s GDP 
United Nations 
Statistical Yearbook 
2012 
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3.2 The Model 
We employed random effects logistic regressions to control for the possible correlations 
between variables and since no individual effects (fixed) are present in the data. We also 
chose the model by performing a Hausman test for random effects with a chibar2 (01) = 
1.000. In addition, the model allows for a comprehensive inclusion of all the variables to 
reduce omitted variable bias. It also has the advantage of being replicable with little or no 
changes to test different geographic areas to see if corruption affects the attraction of FDI 
differently in different locations 
Based on the above method the following model will be used: 
 
 LnFDI = αi + β1CPIit  +  β2CorrDummyit + β3CorrDis1it + β4CorrDis2it + β5Humanit 
               + β6Lawit+ β7Bureaucracyit + β8EcFreedomit + β9Educationit + β10Inflationit 
     + β11Infrastructureit + β12GDPit + β13Unemploymentit +µit + εit  
  
In this model i is the country subscript, t is the time subscript, βs are unknown parameters to 
be estimated, α is the average natural logarithm of FDI for the entire region, µ is the between-
entity error, and ε is the within-entity error. Even though some variables suggested somewhat 
high correlations with each other, a multicollinearity test did not suggest any serious problem. 
In order to test for multicollinearity, we ran a Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation with a 
prob > chi2 = 0.000, which indicates no autocorrelation problems. Also, the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) did not suggest multicollinearity between variables (mean VIF = 4.495). 
4. Results 
Table 2 shows how FDI and corruption correlate in the Latin American region. The results of 
the correlation matrix show a statistically significant negative relationship between FDI and 
the corruption level in the host countries at a p<0.10. Corruption distance presents a strong 
negative correlation at the p<0.001 level between corruption distance and FDI when the host 
countries have a lower corruption level than home countries. On the other hand, corruption 
distance shows a significant positive correlation at the p<0.10 level with FDI when the host 
countries experience higher levels of corruption than the host countries. 
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The random effects regression results for the full sample are presented in Table. In this table 
three models are run. Model 1 analyses how corruption affects the total FDI flows to Latin 
America and excludes the corruption distance variables. This is made to understand how 
corruption affects FDI flows to Latin America. The result from Model 1 shows that the total 
amount of FDI received in Latin America is negatively affected by high levels of corruption 
of the host countries supporting Hypothesis 1 that argues that the total amount of FDI to Latin 
America is deterred by corruption. This result is statistically significant at a level of p<0.10. 
Model 2 analyses how corruption distance affects home countries with lower corruption 
levels than the host countries. The result shows that corruption distance is negatively 
associated (p<0.10) with FDI flows when home countries have a lower level of corruption 
than host countries experiencing high levels of corruption, which supports Hypothesis 2b that 
says that negative corruption distance will have a negative association with FDI inflows. 
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Table 2: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix  
FDI 1            
CPI -0.17* 1           
CorrDis1 -0.20 -0.77*** 1          
CorrDis2 -0.21 -0.45** 0.29* 1         
Human 0.50*** -0.47*** -0.35* 0.1457 1        
Law 0.37** -0.88*** -0.75*** 0.31* 0.64*** 1       
Bureaucracy -0.002 0.58*** 0.46*** -0.07 -0.39** -0.47** 1      
EcFreedom -0.25* -0.24* -0.17 0.15 -0.03 0.24 -0.62*** 1     
Education -0.21 0.33* 0.58*** 0.11 -0.15 -0.38** 0.13 0.08 1    
Inflation 0.06 0.06 -0.07 0.13 -0.23 -0.8 0.39** -0.36* -0.15 1   
Infrastructure 0.38** 5.59*** -0.41** 0.13 0.81*** 0.73*** -0.38** -0.06 -0.25* -0.22 1  
GDP 0.46*** 0.22 0.06 -0.26 0.57*** 0.25* -0.26* -0.22 0.01 -0.30* 0.57*** 1 
Unemployment 0.22 -0.24* -0.02 -0.3 0.48** 0.35* -0.29* -0.05 0.25* -0.21 0.46** 0.40** 
Significance levels: *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Table 3: Results Random Effects Regression 
  
Dependent Variable: FDI      
  
 
  
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CPI  -6.77038* 
  
     
CorrDis1 
 
 -13.8663* 
 
CorrDis2 
 
 
 
1.083765 
Human 
 
122.8364* 183.0966* 185.2531* 
Law 
 
0.4614521** 1.61422*** 1.86183*** 
Bureaucracy 
 
0.11224919 0.2697496 0.940995 
EcFreedom 
 
-0.1567881 0.4805634 -0.8639065 
Education 
 
-1.028834 1.403908 0.3784996 
Inflation 
 
0.7107626 0.6078531 0.6981451 
Infrastructure 
 
-0.5448595* -1.10931* -1.332644* 
GDP 
 
6.829546* 4.799764 2.94363 
Unemployment 
 
-2.371313 -2.442756 -2.846843 
  
 
  
Model Summary 
 
 
  
No. Observations 
 
48 48 48 
No. Host Countries 
 
12 12 12 
Wald Chi2 
 
57.9 62.76 54.1 
Prob>chi2 
 
*** *** *** 
Significance levels: *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively  
5. Discussion 
This paper argues that when investing abroad, foreign investors might be affected not only by 
corruption in the host country but also by ‘corruption distance.’ To study this issue, we 
proposed two hypothesises. Our first hypothesis stated that, in general, corruption would have 
a negative effect on FDI flows to Latin America. Our second hypothesis was divided in two 
parts: the first part proposed that positive corruption distance will have a positive association 
with FDI inflows, while the second part argued that Negative corruption distance will have a 
negative association with FDI inflows. 
Our results support both hypothesis based on the premise that corruption distance would 
negatively affect investors located in countries with low levels of corruption when investing 
in countries with high levels of corruption. On the other hand, firms established in countries 
with high levels of corruption are not affected by high corruption levels in the host countries. 
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These statements are based in the low transaction costs that firms familiar with corruption at 
home face when investing in other countries with similar institutional environments. 
Most studies in this subject conclude that corruption deters FDI (Judge, et al., 2011). 
However, our research indicates that corruption and corruption distance have a different 
effect depending on whether investors are based on countries with high or low corruption. 
Moreover, when the corruption distance between home countries with low levels of 
corruption and host countries with high corruption is higher, the levels of FDI are lower. 
However, when both home and host countries are considered corrupt, the corruption distance 
does not have a significant effect on FDI. This is because firms familiar with operating in 
highly corrupt countries have internalised the knowledge necessary for dealing with 
corruption and have used as a firm-specific O-advantage (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). On 
the other hand, those firms based in countries where corruption is not as prominent may face 
higher costs in order to learn how to cope with corruption in a foreign location. 
This study also integrated institutional theory to the L section of the OLI paradigm to analyse 
how corruption affects FDI. A higher psychic distance may increase cost in the search, 
negotiation and enforcement of contracts abroad, and hence, these conditions may deter FDI 
to certain locations (Meyer, 2001). Therefore, companies prefer to invest in those 
environments that are similar to those at their home countries (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), 
which may include the levels of corruption. Hence, we furthered the L part of the OLI 
paradigm by adding corruption distance between the home and host countries to the concept 
of psychic distance. 
By analysing FDI flows based on their source country, either highly corrupt or less corrupt, 
important issues arise. Consistent with IB literature, this study confirms that corruption deters 
the attraction of FDI. However, this statement is valid if the home country has lower levels of 
corruption than a highly corrupt host country. This result suggests that firms based in 
countries with low corruption see corruption as a high and costly risk, and hence, avoid it 
abroad (Habib & Zurawicki, 2001). However, if the source of FDI is divided into countries 
with high or low levels of corruption, we can see that corruption has different effects on 
foreign investors. 
Firms based in developed countries are generally not familiar with corruption in their home 
market and have signed the OECD anti-corruption in international business transactions 
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(OECD, 1997). Therefore, they face greater pressures to obtain legitimacy from their home 
governments and from their headquarters than firms from highly corrupt countries (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). Glynn and Abzug (2002) argue that in order to gain legitimacy, firms 
adapt to the institutional context on which they operate. This means that firms based in less 
corrupt countries, where corruption is not tolerated, would avoid engaging in corrupt deals. 
On the other hand, MNEs based in highly corrupt countries are familiar with performing in 
countries with underdeveloped institutions (Dawar & Frost, 1999), and have not subscribed to 
such laws. Therefore, when facing similar conditions abroad, they already have the expertise 
to cope, they face little pressures from their stakeholders, and they do not have a legal 
impediment to engage in corrupt acts. These might be the reasons explaining why corruption 
does not appear to have a negative effect on FDI from highly corrupt countries to Latin 
America.    
6. Conclusion 
 
In this study we analysed how corruption distance affects FDI according to the source 
country, either more or less corrupt than the host country. We made this distinction in order 
to analyse whether or not firms from each set of countries react differently to corruption in 
the host country. We also included the concept of ‘corruption distance’ in order to evaluate 
how the difference in levels of corruption between host and home countries affected FDI. Our 
results suggest that corruption distance has a negative effect on FDI from when the home 
countries experience lower levels of corruption than the host countries. On the other hand, 
firms from highly corrupt countries were not affected by corruption distance when investing 
in the area. 
 
Grounded on the transaction cost and institutional theories we argue that firms based in 
corrupt countries have internalised knowledge of how to deal with corruption. This O- 
specific advantage helps these firms to lower the costs associated with coping with corruption 
abroad. We also explain this phenomenon by arguing that firms based on highly corrupt 
countries choose to operate in locations that are psychically close to them, which include high 
levels of corruption. Thus, we furthered the L part of the OLI paradigm by including 
corruption distance between the home and host countries to the concept of psychic distance. 
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This paper contributes two main aspects to the IB field. Firstly, we place special emphasis on 
acquiring and internalising knowledge of how to deal with weak institutional environments 
abroad. IB literature argues that firms from countries with low levels of corruption (generally 
developed countries) have an upper hand due to their ownership-specific advantages; 
however, firms based in less developed countries (generally with high levels of corruption) 
have acquired advantages by learning to operate in challenging locations. 
 
Secondly, we provide empirical evidence to complement studies suggesting that firms based 
on countries with high levels of corruption are not affected by this issue when investing 
abroad. By doing so, we were able to contribute to the study of how corruption affects FDI. 
Future studies should take into account not only the host country corruption levels, but also 
how well equipped the home country is to cope with this problem. Due to the availability of 
data, we only separated FDI to Latin America as either from more corrupt or less corrupt 
countries. Nevertheless, new studies should analyse how corruption and corruption distance 
affect FDI to the region at the industry level. 
 
Finally, this study is also important for policy makers. Even though this research argues that 
corruption does not have a significant effect on the attraction of FDI when both the home and 
host countries are considered highly corrupt, it is necessary to point out that the majority of 
FDI to Latin America is carried out by MNEs based in countries with low levels of corruption. 
Therefore, authorities should work to improve the institutional environment of the host 
countries in order to attract more FDI to the region. 
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